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Abstract 
According to the contemporary political economy literature on France, the country 
appears caught in the worst of all possible worlds: it fails to create the conditions for 
economic growth and employment by deregulating labour markets as the UK has 
done, and it lacks the institutional infrastructure that makes the German economy an 
export success. This paper, which analyses the adjustment of the French economy 
in the 1980s and into the 1990s, argues that this image of France is wrong. This 
literature misunderstands the relative position of French industry and misinterprets 
how firms managed to successfully make the transition from conventional mass 
production to flexible quality production. The particular French mode of co-
ordination, revolving around the state-centered elite political-economic structure, 
was at the basis of this adjustment path. The paper analyses how this mode of co-
ordination interacted with the crisis of the French production regime in the early 
1980s, and with the changes in the ownership structures of large firms in response 
to that crisis. The resulting corporate governance structure increased the autonomy 
of top management from the state as well as capital markets, and led to a situation 
whereby far-reaching organisational changes in the large companies could be 
pursued. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der gegenwärtigen Fachliteratur zufolge befindet sich die französische Volks-
wirtschaft in einer äußerst problematischen Lage: Versuche, die Bedingungen für 
Wirtschaftswachstum und neue Arbeitsplätze durch Deregulierung nach britischem 
Vorbild zu schaffen, schlagen fehl. Die institutionelle Infrastruktur, auf welcher die 
deutsche Exportstärke beruht, ist aber ebensowenig gegeben. 
Das vorliegende Papier, in dem die Anpassung der französischen Wirtschaft in den 
achtziger und bis in die neunziger Jahre hinein analysiert wird, argumentiert, daß 
dieses Frankreichbild falsch ist. Es beruht auf einer Fehlinterpretation der Art und 
Weise, in der es Firmen gelungen ist, den Übergang von herkömmlicher Massen-
produktion zu flexiblen, qualitätsorientierten Herstellungsverfahren zu schaffen. Die 
besondere französische Art der Koordination, die auf einer staatszentrierten, 
elitegeprägten wirtschaftspolitischen Struktur basiert, bildete die Grundlage dieses 
Anpassungspfades. 
Das Papier untersucht, welchen Einfluß diese Art der Koordination auf die Krise des 
französischen Produktionsregimes zu Beginn der achtziger Jahre sowie auf die 
daraus resultierenden Veränderungen in der Eigentumsstruktur großer Unternehmen 
hatte. Die Corporate Governance Struktur, die das Ergebnis dieses Prozesses war, 
erhöhte die Unabhängigkeit von Spitzenmanagern gegenüber Staat und 
Kapitalmärkten und schuf damit die Möglichkeit zu weitreichenden organisatorischen 
Veränderungen innerhalb der großen Unternehmen. 
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1. Introduction: Francosclerosis? 
To many it has become a well-known refrain: France is the problem case in the 
European Union. Whereas German industry makes the country an economic 
powerhouse, the flexibility of the Third Italy has secured the survival of 
technologically less sophisticated companies, and the labour market deregulation in 
the UK under the Thatcher regime created the preconditions for economic growth 
and employment successes, the French economy seems to be caught in the worst of 
all worlds, and utterly incapable of doing anything about it. Companies remain 
organised in a top-down manner at a time that flatter hierarchies are presented as 
recipes for success; many small companies who are the engines of growth in other 
countries, are financially weak and technologically underdeveloped; the main 
corporate strategy is price-based competition; and the few attempts to deregulate 
the labour market seem to have given way not to less, but more unemployment. 
Reform attempts inevitably lead to large-scale conflicts, organised by small groups 
who refuse to give up their privileges. And in the background of all this looms the 
heavy shadow of the French state, at a time when governments in other OECD-
countries are rapidly withdrawing from the economy. 
This image of France is wrong. That is the basic message of this chapter. While 
the above picture may describe a world that was, in the last two decades, the French 
political economy has gone through dramatic changes, that have fundamentally 
changed the internal operations of businesses, their market positioning and relations 
with the French state. The endemic conflict in the workplace has, despite occasional 
and highly publicised outbursts of protest, all but disappeared: French strike figures 
are currently among the lowest in the OECD, and workers' skills are put to good use 
by many companies. With the support of their large customers, small firms have 
been able to upgrade their operations substantially. Cost competitiveness remains 
important to French industry, but most firms now combine that with quality and 
flexibility. And, despite the strong presence of the state, its role is considerably 
smaller today than it was in the past. 
The most remarkable thing about these changes is not that they have taken 
place - after all, the entire postwar history of France consists of profound change 
(Boltho 1996; Fourastié 1979; Kindleberger 1963; Sicsic and Wyplosz 1996) - but 
that the state has not been the main actor in the process. Even today, analysing 
industrial modernisation in France means understanding how the state pulls or 
pushes society out of its deadlock. Yet the adjustment process alluded to above took 
place at a time when the state attempted an orchestrated retreated from the 
economic scene (Boyer 1997). After a nationalisation spree in the early years of the 
first Mitterand presidency, many banks and companies have been (re-)privatised, the 
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credit system has been liberalised and the central planning apparatus was devolved 
into a more decentralised support system for local companies. In short, whereas 
before the state was the central player in the French political economy, it is very 
hard to keep on seeing it as such today. 
This chapter argues that the changes in the French political economy are best 
understood as a reorganisation of the basic configuration of the French political 
economy, not a fundamental shift to another production regime on a Germano-
Japanese or Anglo-Saxon footing. For most of the postwar period, the French state 
was indeed the central actor, who used the large firms to assure that modernisation 
took place according to its plans. The state set technological goals for them, 
provided them with credit and organised their labour market for them. As a result, 
during the postwar period, the large firms were in fact the state's instruments in 
these policies. Today, this situation is reversed. The large firms have gained 
autonomy from the state and instead of being instruments of state policies, they are 
increasingly exploiting those policies for their own strategies. 
This outcome was the result of the particular French mode of coordination, and 
how this fed into the corporate adjustment path in France. Methodologically, 
therefore, the chapter develops an understanding of the French production regime 
using the analytical tools in this comparative volume. Despite persistent claims of 
exceptionalism, France too can be studied as a capitalist economy organised 
according to a particular mode of coordination, and as in other countries as well, this 
mode of coordination has been the organisational framework for the adjustment of 
French industry since the second oil shock. 
The remainder of this chapter starts with a short systematic review of the most 
important changes in the French production regime between the mid-1970s and 
today, a discussion of how the contemporary literature on the French political 
economy has understood this and what an approach based on coordination can offer 
in addition to those analyses. Section 3 will present the story in full: how the crisis of 
the French production regime challenged the basic parameters of the French model, 
how the state and the elite reacted, and how these reactions led to a new 
organisation of the French production regime. Section 4 concludes by summarising 
the main points and by asking questions about the viability of the new French model. 
2. Explaining Adjustment in France 
Comparing stylised pictures of French industry in 1975 and in 1995 gives an idea of 
the degree of change in the French political economy. In the mid-1970s, workplaces 
were highly taylorised, where low-skilled workers performed extremely narrow tasks 
(Crozier 1964). As late as 1982, almost 60% of all workers in France were semi- and 
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unskilled (d'lribarne 1989). In comparative perspective, France not only had a much 
higher supervisors to workers ratio (Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre 1988; Maurice, 
Sellier and Sylvestre 1986), but also employed, controlling for all the usual variables, 
simply more people (Lane 1989). Labour relations were highly conflictual, and 
unions were important obstacles to organisational change. Suppliers were small 
firms, more interested in their own survival than in the conquest of new markets and 
therefore perennially underfinanced and technologically backward. The large firms 
treated them as extended workshops rather than fully independent firms. The 
corporate governance system, finally, was a mixture of direct state-control via 
ownership, indirect state-control via the credit system and the planning apparatus, 
all run by a small group of meritocratic elites (Shonfield 1965; Zysman 1983). 
The picture in 1995 is fundamentally different. Workplaces still have a strong 
Taylorist flavour, but instead of isolated jobs performed by unskilled workers, the 
shopfloor in many companies is made up of teams of polyvalent workers (Dublin 
Foundation 1998; (Duval 1996; Duval 1998). Labour unions have by all accounts 
become irrelevant in the contemporary French political economy. Only some 9% of 
the workforce is organised today, and in the private sector alone, the organisation 
rate has dropped to 5%. Despite their monopoly in works councils sections, labour 
unions have lost the works councils to independent lists (Daley 1996b). In 
comparative perspective, France has become a low-strike country: between 1980 
and 1990, strike rates were converging on the low German one, distancing from the 
much higher rates in Italy and the UK (Boltho 1996). Small firms and their 
relationships with large firms have changed as well. Most importantly, small firms, 
more than half of which make a substantial share of their turnover as suppliers, are 
much stronger technologically and organisationally: almost without exception 
suppliers are certified according to the prevailing international ISO 9000 quality 
management standard and as a result, they now are an active partner to their 
customers among the large firms while counting many international companies 
among their customers (Hancké and Casper 1996). The corporate governance 
system too has changed in character: between 1986 and 1993, many formerly state-
owned companies have been privatised, the system for industrial credit has been 
transformed around the stock market, and as a result of its increased autonomy, 
management is considerably more immune to state intrusion. 
How should we understand these changes? Both the literature on economic 
change in advanced capitalism and the more narrow debate on the recent evolution 
in France in particular, have produced two broad perspectives to understand the 
transition reflected in these data. The first interpretation, which has a long pedigree 
in studies of France, argues that change as such is nothing new in France. Postwar 
economic development, captured in the phrase of the trente glorieuses, primarily 
was change orchestrated by the state. Through the industrial policy apparatus, the 
planning mechanism and ownership of strategic sectors of the economy, the French 
state succeeded in creating the conditions for a profound transformation of the 
French economy from a largely agricultural society to a modern industrial power 
(Berger 1972; Estrin and Holmes 1983; Hall 1986). This same policy-making 
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apparatus, slightly modified to meet the challenges of the new situation, was also at 
the basis of recent developments. The state conceived policies that the main 
economic actors had to follow, and then used the industrial policy and economic 
planning apparatus as well as the broader legislative process to induce the latter to 
do so. 
This interpretation explains how, as a result of direct state intervention, the 
French car industry rebounded after a profound crisis that led the two national car 
producers into virtual bankruptcy (Hart 1992). It understands the reorganisation of 
the French steel industry after its own succession of crises since the late 1970s as a 
result of state policies that helped companies restructure and corporate and labour 
union interests converge on a new industrial plan for the industry (Daley 1996a). 
This argument is also at the basis of an account of the process of privatisation in 
France after 1986 and how it contributed to a profound restructuring in many 
industries, and led to a substantial difference in management styles and orientations 
(Schmidt 1996). 
However, these accounts do not tell the whole story. The equally dramatic 
failures of some of the state policies in other industries, for example in the computer 
and machine-tool industries (Ziegler 1997; Zysman 1977) should raise questions 
about the omniscient and omnipotent French state. Precisely at the moment, for 
instance, that the machine-tool industry required higher skills and more flexible 
forms of work organisation in order for companies to position themselves in more 
quality-oriented and less cost-sensitive markets, the French state attempted to 
modernise the industry by imposing policies copied from the large firms that 
competed in mas markets (Ziegler 1997). 
The state-centered argument also ignores an even more important policy 
development of the 1980s. What probably characterised French economic and 
industrial policy most during that period, were the attempts by the state to retreat 
from direct economic and industrial policy-making. After a nationalisation wave in 
1981, governments have put considerable energy into privatising the state-owned 
companies. Labour relations we reorganised in such a way that the state played a 
smaller role, and unions and employers were presented with the possibility of 
negotiating change on their own. And in a dramatic attempt to reorganise the state 
apparatus, a series of decentralisation laws was passed that aimed at creating new 
regional and local partnerships for economic development. All these policies were 
informed by what has become known as "Toquevillian liberalism," which implied a 
simultaneous reduction of central state involvement in policy-making, and a 
devolution of power to local and regional societal actors - in short, the opposite of a 
state-centered, dirigiste policy.1 
1 These government initiatives ultimately failed: neither the labour unions nor employers were strong 
enough to carry through the reforms, and the régionalisation hit very poor soil in the regions, 
where no local actors could be found (or created) to provide an underpinning for the policies. 
Whether they failed or not, however, is not important for the purposes of this argument. What 
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An alternative interpretation builds on the reduced state role in contemporary 
France. What explains the transition in this view, was that firms were subjected to 
new forms of competition, a process in which the state actively participated. By 
deregulating the environment of companies - in capital markets with the financial 
deregulation of 1984, and in labour markets since the mid-1980s - competition in 
these areas was intensified, and economic actors, i.e. banks, companies and 
workers, were forced to cope with this new situation. This interpretation has strong 
adherence in France itself, mainly among progressive Gaullist and left-wing 
observers (Comm. Général du Plan 1997; Bourdieu,), who deplore the grip of 
international capital markets on the French economy and how globalisation 
jeopardises the traditional, mainly state-organised bonds of solidarity (Hoang-Ngoc 
1998; Lipietz 1998; Todd 1998). 
Without denying that economic adjustment in France has had disruptive social 
consequences, it is hard to see how this could have been a direct effect of 
deregulation and increased competition. By all accounts, industrial concentration 
has increased in France during this period: in response to the crisis that the large 
exporting industrial companies faced in the first half of the 1980s, the restructuring of 
industrial sectors frequently entailed a further reduction of the number of large firms 
in these sectors. In the automobile industry, for example, two firms, Renault and 
Peugeot, who are roughly equal in size (in terms of turnover and employment) 
dominate the sector. The steel industry, which was made up of a few large and many 
small producers before, was consolidated into one gigantic steel conglomerate in the 
mid-1980s. And the government used its ownership of the chemical industry to 
restructure the industry into a few complementary rather than competing firms. 
Overall, in most industries, one or very few large companies accounted for over 50% 
of turnover in 1994 (INSEE 1996). 
Most importantly, perhaps, the abrupt and far-reaching deregulation of the 
financial sector - one of the main instances of the explicit introduction of a policy that 
aimed at increasing competition - did not result in a competitive capital market 
characterised by a high merger and take-over activity, but in a highly orchestrated 
system of hard-core cross-shareholdings, which were formed precisely in an attempt 
to prevent rampant competition (Bauer 1988; Maclean 1995; Morin 1995). In short, 
none of the outcomes conventionally associated with a market-led adjustment 
process can be found in France. 
Understanding adjustment in the France over the last two decades requires 
going beyond the state-market opposition that is central in political economy, and 
bring in firms - in the case of France the large exporting companies in particular - as 
the key actors. The modernisation of the French economy over the last two decades 
was not a state- or market-led process, but a firm-led one, whereby firms used public 
matters is that they were attempts by the state to disengage itself from these different fields of 
economic policy-making. See (Levy 1994) for full details of these policies and their failures. 
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resources on their own terms and for their own adjustment, and then induced other 
actors, through power, competition and co-operation, to act in a congruent manner. 
Anybody familiar with the postwar French economy will hardly be surprised by 
the central role of large firms in the adjustment process. The entire Gaullist 
modernisation program was constructed around them as the engines of economic 
development, and after the arrival of the Left in office in 1981, the nationalisations of 
the same year announced themselves as the logical continuation of the Gaullist 
strategy. In this situation, however, the large firms were - with only a slight sense of 
exaggeration - instruments for broader social, economic, techological and regional 
development goals pursued by the state. In exchange, the state provided them with 
an institutional infrastructure in labour relations, regional development agencies and 
technology transfer systems that allowed them to grow in a stable manner. Yet what 
distinguishes the current from the former setup, is that the large firms now have 
considerably more autonomy in designing their goals while relying considerably less 
upon state initiatives in their implementation. Instead of being objects of state 
policies, the large firms had become the agents of a profound modernisation 
process. 
The organisational basis for this shift toward a large firm-led adjustment model 
was the mode of coordination in France, which is based on a particular 
configuration, different from both the German associational model and the Anglo-
Saxon market model of economic coordination discussed in other essays in this 
volume. It entails a system whereby the state, banks and large firms are intertwined 
through a complex elite network. In the course of their education, the „best and the 
brightest" of a cohort are selected through a series of difficult exams, after which 
they go on to study at the grandes écoles, and from where they are recruited into the 
top of the state administration. After a career in the state apparatus, these people 
then move into other areas as top managers in large companies or banks, and 
almost invariably start, with several years intervals, moving between these three 
spheres (Birnbaum 1994; Bourdieu 1989; Suleiman 1979; Suleiman and Mendras 
1995). In the 1980s as much as in the 1960s and 70s, most CEOs in France have, in 
fact, followed this typical career path over the grandes écoles into the state 
apparatus and the government and then into finance or business (and back, when 
duty called) (Bauer and Bertin-Mourot 1995). 
This mode of coordination relies upon several mechanisms. The first is the 
meritocratic selection mechanism, which imbues all participants with an elitist ethos, 
producing a relative autonomy, on the basis of educational credentials, of 
management: different studies in different eras demonstrated that the social distance 
between top management and the rest of the company (who have not followed this 
elite education trajectory) is vast in France (Crozier 1964; Hofstede 1980). The 
meritocracy also socialises the members of the elite into one basic world view. 
Empirical studies of the financial elite in France, one of the pillars of the system, 
show, for example, that the educational background in the grandes écoles, more 
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than political convictions and similar experience, provides the social cement for 
interaction among this group (Kadushin 1995). The final element deals, after this 
initial period of socialisation, with the monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms within 
the elite. As a result of the relatively small size of the group, the track record of 
individual members who pursue a career is in principle knowledge shared by all in 
the elite, and forms the basis for further career advances. The individual reputation 
in this elite network, with its roots in the state, therefore is the currency used among 
the financial, economic and bureaucratic elites in France. 
In the early 1980s, a profound crisis hit the French production regime, and this 
elite coordination structure became the organisational framework for the subsequent 
adjustment. It filtered the effects of both the financial deregulation of 1984 and the 
privatisations of 1986 and thus allowed a reorganisation of the corporate 
governance system. Deregulation and privatisation could - and were designed to -
impose a regime of intense competition upon CEOs, which included detailed scrutiny 
by investors. In fact, however, the elite coordination mechanism led to the opposite 
situation: it allowed for a large sphere of autonomy for top management, by shielding 
the CEOs of large firms from outside influences - both the state and capital markets -
during the process of internal corporate reorganisation. Because of this relative 
insulation, CEOs were now able to pursue their conception of competitiveness and 
profitability with considerably more vigour than under the state's aegis. 
However, as the literature on the inertia of the French model predicted, firms 
could not simply move out of the old situation by CEO fiat. In order to pursue their 
internal adjustment, the companies heavily relied on public resources. The firms 
used the panoply of regional government agencies, technology institutes and 
training centers, as well as the different laws and administrative instruments that 
dealt with the labour market, as instruments to fill the holes in their own adjustment 
capacities. By doing so, they also ended up inducing the other relevant actors -
small firms, labour unions and workers - to act in a manner congruent with the path 
they took. 
Posing the issue this way, raises a crucial question: If the French adjustment 
path was indeed a firm-led one, then why did different companies in France, despite 
variations in ownership, technology and economic sector adopt this trajectory? 
Again, the answer to this puzzle is in large measure provided by the co-ordination 
mechanism. First of all, all companies were - and were also perceived to be - in a 
similar structural situation. Typical of the French growth model, they had combined 
low profitability with soft budget constraints in a highly inflationary environment, 
which had led to a situation where corporate debt was high in all companies (Hall 
1986; Taddéi and Coriat 1993; Zysman 1983). As a result of that, the pressures for 
structural adjustment, which entailed profound cost-cutting measures, during the 
crisis was the same everywhere. In fact, the socialist government under Fabius, an 
ENA graduate who became Minister of Industry after Chevènement and succeeded 
prime minister Mauroy in 1984, formally imposed profitability criteria upon all the 
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state-owned companies and made subsidies contingent upon the production of a 
convincing business plan. For both structural and political reasons, therefore, the 
dominant definition of the crisis of French industry within the elite, was a cost crisis. 
Secondly, as discussed in more detail in section 3.3 below, the core feature of 
the privatisation processes was that company shares were sold off to so-called hard 
cores (noyaux durs in French) of stable long-term investors. While such a 
privatisation strategy was initially seen as a way to assure that French industry 
would remain in French hands (Schmidt 1996), this governance structure also 
provided firms with long-term capital that did not pass through the Trésor or the 
Ministry of Finance; simultaneously, therefore, the state's direct impact upon firm 
strategy was reduced while the short-termness of the stock market was neutralised. 
Since the privatisation of the large firms always entailed the construction of a "hard 
core" of investors, the result was that roughly similar corporate governance 
mechanisms were installed in different companies (Goldstein 1996). Furthermore, 
since the capital structure was one of mutual cross-shareholdings, all members of 
the elite network in fact controlled each other, and thus indirectly themselves. 
Three related mechanisms explain how information about possible adjustment 
paths flowed between the members of the elite and thus led not only to a 
convergence in the definition of the problems, but in fact contributed to a common 
search for solutions as well. The first crucial element was their initial socialisation 
into and their reputation in the elite network. The French elite have not only been 
trained to see problems in similar ways; they also have a hard sanctioning 
mechanism that precludes structural dissidence. This is related to the second large 
element: in contrast to, for example, American, Japanese or German CEOs, French 
managers have not adopted a corporate culture that originated within a particular 
company - simply because they have not spent a long time in one particular 
company (Schmidt 1996). As a result, their corporate culture is an elite ethos, which 
results from their circulation across companies and from membership in a small 
number of clubs of like-minded people and friends (Kadushin). Finally, the cross-
shareholdings assured that the information between the members of the elite could 
easily be discussed and transferred. Mutual control in company boards implied 
mutual understandings about adjustment problems and solutions (Morin 1989). 
In sum, elite coordination provided large firms with the institutional prerequisites 
for a profound reorganisation of the companies, by shielding management from 
external influences, and by offering a framework for jointly developing assessments 
of the crisis as well as incentives for solutions. The remainder of this chapter will 
develop this argument, first by showing how exactly top management increased its 
autonomy, and then by detailing how companies restructured internally by 
reorganising their ties with workers and suppliers. 
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3. The French political economy in the 1980s. 
The reorganisation of the French production regime followed a profound crisis in the 
early 1980s. The key ingredients of such a reorganisation were the restructuring of 
the firms' internal operations, i.e. workplace reorganisation and suppliers links. 
However, such restructuring had traditionally proven to be very difficult because of 
the endemic inertia in the French model (Crozier 1964; Crozier 1970). Given the 
crucial role of the state in French industry, a reorganisation of the corporate 
governance system was a necessary condition, so that top management was 
allowed autonomy from the state and labour unions. This section is built around that 
logical sequence. It starts with an analysis of the crisis of the early 1980s, then 
moves on to the reorganisation of the corporate governance system and how 
precisely it created the conditions for CEO autonomy. The final two sub-sections 
then discuss the substantive changes in workplace and how the links between large 
firms and their suppliers were reorganised. 
3.1. The crisis of the French production regime 
Between 1980 and 1985, the French production regime experienced two separate 
but mutually reinforcing crises. The first was an internal crisis of the large firms in the 
first half of the 1980s; the second a crisis of the supporting macro-economic policy 
regime. Despite the mass production strategies based on economies of scale - which 
themselves were relatively successful, since many large firms became leaders in 
European markets in the early 1980s - the companies posted dramatically low profits 
in this period: aggregate profitability in France was among the lowest in the G7 (Glyn 
1997). Moreover, as a result of the implicit soft budget constraints for many among 
them that resulted from the state's willingness to finance their growth, their 
expansion had led to a situation were they found themselves with an extremely high 
debt burden, the highest in the OECD (Hall 1986). Third, labour productivity was low 
by European standards. Detailed comparative assessments of car production, for 
example, demonstrated that the French automobile industry, at that moment a 
market leader in Europe, was less productive even than FIAT: Peugeot calculated 
that it produced 8.3 cars per worker per year in 1983 (down from 9 in 1979), FIAT 
almost 12 (up from 10) cars and Ford-Europe 13.2 (up from 10.4) (Loubet 1998). 
Finally, massive social conflicts in those sectors that spearheaded the French 
economy exacerbated the internal problems: semi-skilled workers refused the 
organisation of work and the concurrent lack of career perspectives that came with it 
. Combined, these four elements led to a profitability crisis of gigantic proportions in 
French industry. Table 1 presents a picture of French industry in the early 1980s. 
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Table 1: Financial results of large firms, 1981-85 
(in billions of francs) 
 
Accumulated results 1981-85 
Sacilor                                      -25.30  
Usinor                                      -25.00 
Renault                                  -27.40  
CDF-Chimie                              -6.50  
Péchineya                                  3.90  
Bull                                               -2.80  
CGCT                                          -2.30  
Thomsonb                                   1.90 
EMC                                            -0.60  
SNECMA                                     -0.02  
Matra                                     +0.40 
Aérospatiale                            +0.80  
Dassault                                   +1.90  
Saint-Gobain                            +2.50  
CGE                                               +2.60  
Rhône-Poulenc                       +3.00 
 
source: V. Schmidt, From State to Market? p.108 
 
a excluding capital grant to PCUK (3 billion francs) excluding 
capital grant to Thomson-Telecom (1 .1 billion francs) 
A profound crisis of "external" conditions accompanied this internal crisis. The 
expansionary policies pursued by the Left government after May 1981, rapidly gave 
way to serious problems. International capital markets began to speculate against 
the franc, and the government was increasingly running into budgetary problems as 
a result of the macro-economic expansion and the nationalisations (which cost over 
FF 130 Billion). In March 1983, the government therefore decided, after serious 
debate (Cameron 1996; Halimi 1992), to leave the "socialism in one country" policy 
and adopt a more restrictive stance (Hall 1986). The political decision to stay within 
the ERM, and thus reorient French economic policy in order to strengthen the franc 
by fighting inflation, provided the broad macro-economic background for the crisis of 
the French production regime. 
The macro-economic policy adopted after 1983, which carried the euphemistic 
name of "competitive disinflation," had two goals. The first and most important one 
was to create the domestic economic conditions for a stabilisation of the franc after 
the devaluations of 1982-3. The instrument was straightforward wage restraint by 
imposing inflation targets on wage negotiations. As a result, France became, after 
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Portugal and Greece, the country with the lowest real wage growth in the EU after 
1985 (Taddéi and Coriat 1993). The second goal followed from the first and was an 
attempt to emulate the hard currency environment that had been so beneficial to 
German industry: unable to rely on competitive devaluations for export success, the 
argument went (Albert 1991), German industry was forced to search for 
competitiveness in quality rather than price. 
These macro-economic policies radically changed the broader environment of 
companies. In the short run, the franc fort policy raised French interest rates to the 
highest level in the OECD, while, more structurally, the adherence to the ERM (later 
EMS) also implied an acceptance of the broader framework of competition rules 
regarding subsidies for ailing companies within the EU. The high interest rates hit 
the companies at the worst possible moment: not only did they raise the price of 
productive investments, the highly indebted companies were severely punished by 
this situation: for some of them debt servicing reached over 15% of annual turnover! 
Finally, budgetary constraints and adoption of EU competition rules, moreover, led to 
a structurally new situation: the well-known option of having the state finance the 
losses until the business cycle picked up again was increasingly becoming 
impossible as a viable option. 
3.2. State-led corporate survival 
Despite the restrictions on state involvement, the government in fact played a crucial 
role in the first phase of the adjustment process. Having assumed ownership of 
many large firms after the advent to power of a Left government, the government 
could now shelter the large companies from bankruptcy and foreign take-overs.2 
While nationalising the industry and the credit sector in the first year of the Mitterand 
presidency were primarily couched in anti-capitalist terms, broader strategic 
objectives, evoking the Gaullist program of maintaining a strong national industrial 
basis as a precondition for political grandeur, were never far away. Mitterand 
expressed this idea powerfully when he presented the nationalisations to the public 
in September 1991, and explained that if nationalisations did not take place, "these 
companies would rapidly be internationalised" (quoted in (Cohen 1996): 227). 
By the time they were hit by the crisis, many of the large companies were 
therefore state-owned, which allowed them to become recipients of massive state 
aid: combined the companies listed in Table 1 received over FF 64 Billion in 
subsidies, three quarters of which went to the steel companies Usinor and Sacilor 
(subsequently nationalised, merged and restructured) and Renault alone ((Schmidt 
1996): 108). Importantly, however, in all cases, the subsidies were accompanied by 
the negotiation of a detailed business plan. 
2 Even though failures happened. See (Cohen 1989) for details. 
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The goal of the business plans in the different industries was invariably a rapid 
restructuring in order to redress the dramatic financial situation by means of a 
massive cost-cutting program. The first effort in this regard was the negotiation of a 
series of social plans to rapidly reduce the workforce in the companies. Between 
1984 and 1987, Renault thus reduced its total workforce by almost 30.000, or 20% 
(Freyssenet 1998). The Peugeot group did the same: between 1980 and 1987, 
57.000 workers were laid off (23% of the workforce) (Loubet 1998). The steel 
industry, where the crisis had set in a few years earlier, reduced employment in the 
sector by 45% between 1980 and 1987 (Daley 1996a). Overall, the large companies 
shed 20% of their jobs in the 1980s (Berger 1995; INSEE 1993; SESSI 1997). 
Since hard lay-offs were (and are) very difficult in France - in contrast to the 
Anglo-Saxon economies - the large firms were forced to search for other ways to 
reduce employment. These were found in the wide array of state programs that were 
made available to workers in early retirement and the measures that were 
associated with more restrictive immigration policies (Guillemard 1991). More than 
half of the workforce reductions in the car industry were financed by these measures 
(and for the remaining ones, the companies relied upon other state programs for 
industrial conversion), the massive workforce reductions in the steel industry were 
almost entirely state-financed through the early retirement system (Daley 1996a), 
and even the SNCF managed its workforce restructuring through reliance upon the 
state (Cauchon 1997). 
The second big cost-cutting move by the large firms was a rapid extension of 
sub-contracting by means of outsourcing production and services. Between 1979 
and 1985, for example, the vertical integration rate of Renault and PSA fell from 26% 
to 19% for the first and from 35% to 26% for the second. Electricité de France, the 
large state-owned utility company, did the same: instead of hiring new workers, the 
company hired subcontractors for the maintenance of its nuclear plants and network, 
and for local customer service. EDF workers that were hired, furthermore, were hired 
with regular labour contracts, not any longer on the civil servant statute typical of 
EDF workers. 
These sub-contracting operations had the advantage of rapidly clearing the 
balance sheets, since many of the supporting activities associated with the 
subcontracted tasks were eliminated as well: product development, process 
engineering, training, quality control, etc. And in assembly industries subcontracting 
also implied just-in-time delivery of parts upon demand, which had the additional 
financial advantage of reducing capital tied up in the inventory of parts to a 
minimum. Between 1984 and 1987, for example, Renault used these plans to reduce 
its stock of cars that were made but not yet sold by 55%, and despite the increase in 
outsourcing, reduced its purchasing/turnover ratio by 8 percentage points between 
1984 and 1988, due to the renegotiation of prices with suppliers (Freyssenet 1998). 
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Through a reorganisation of the production and service chain, and as a result of 
dramatic cuts in their workforce, the large firms in France thus managed a serious 
reduction of their immediate production costs. The most remarkable example of such 
a turnaround is probably Renault, whereas the company lost over FF 11 Billion per 
year in 1984 and 1985, from 1987 onwards, Renault posted high profits (and 
continued to do so for the following ten years). The same happened in other large 
companies. After the crisis of the early 1980s, for example, the French steel industry, 
now concentrated in Usinor-Sacilor, became one of the most profitable on the 
continent (Smith 1998), EDF managed to turn structural operating deficits into an 
operating surplus despite the government's claims on its revenue. In short, by 1987, 
and as a result of the cost-cutting measures, the large firms had secured their 
financial survival. 
3.3. Elite coordination and corporate adjustment 
While these restructuring plans solved the short-term cost problems and thus helped 
stabilise the French political economy in the short run, they created a series of 
entirely new challenges for the large firms. Sustained profitability, which had become 
the main goal by the mid-1980s, was only possible through a series of organisational 
innovations that increased productivity. Two areas were, given the existing 
weaknesses of French organisations, of crucial importance: workforce skills and the 
organisation of work, on the one hand, and subcontractors and suppliers, on the 
other. The post-mass production era required broadly trained teams of workers 
instead of unskilled workers as well as sophisticated suppliers to address the 
volatility of demand (Piore and Sabel 1984). 
Yet these were precisely the type of reorganisations that had traditionally proven 
to be difficult in France. Despite the "presidentialism" of French management and 
the relative weakness of labour unions, corporate reorganisations were difficult, 
because of a number of reasons: the state kept a close watch on the social policies 
of large firms, French workers were insufficiently trained for them to be deployed 
flexibly, structures for workers' participation on the shopfloor did not exist, while 
unions managed to mobilise possible sources of discontent in shopfloor 
reorganisation and thus thwart shopfloor adjustment strategies. Moreover, increased 
outsourcing was certain to raise union resistance, because of the job losses they 
implied. In short, a reorganisation of work could succeed only if management proved 
able to neutralise both the state and the labour unions. 
Suppliers, on the other hand, had traditionally been treated as simple executors 
of large firm orders, were technologically unsophisticated without proper innovation 
capacities as a result, and therefore simply incapable of dealing with any new 
demands from large firms. Since any reorganisation of the supplier networks of large 
firms would entail a dramatic restructuring of the small firm sector, which included 
dropping some altogether and reorganising the others through technology programs 
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and mergers. Governments would be hard put to accept the social consequences of 
such a reorganisation. Again, a strategy based on technologically well-equipped 
small firms could only succeed if management had a free hand in restructuring its 
supplier base. 
The autonomy of top management from both the state and the stock market thus 
became a necessary condition to pursue internal reorganisations. Autonomy from 
the first was necessary to be able to drop a broad social and political dimension from 
management decisions and concentrate solely or at least primarily on profitability; 
fortunately, that was also the Fabius government's message to CEOs in the midst of 
the crisis of corporate France in the early 1980s. Yet being shielded from the 
immediate impact of the stock market was equally important, since corporate 
reorganisations announced themselves as a relatively long-term process, which 
required patient capital: without protection from the short-termness of the stock 
market, many companies would have been unable to survive the financial pressures 
they were exposed to under an open capital market. 
The elite-based co-ordination mechanism, which tied the large firms to the state, 
provided the conditions for management autonomy from both the state and the stock 
market. As discussed before, the set-up was one in which top management was 
sealed off from the rest of the company, but tightly linked to the administrative 
apparatus. The privatisations of the 1980s and 1990s, grafted themselves upon this 
system, but led to a profound change in the way it operated. Because of how the 
privatisations took place, they created a protective circle of core shareholders, giving 
the CEO more autonomy from the state while protecting the company against take-
overs. If the state was able to directly influence decision-making in large companies 
before, the changes in ownership structure made that much harder in the future. The 
hard core of investors that grew out of the privatisation process simultaneously 
became the central point of reference for management action, and offered protection 
against invasive initiatives by the state. 
Understanding how this happened, requires going back to the end of the 1970s 
and early 1980s, before the reforms dealing with finance were implemented. The 
core of the relationship between industry and the banks in France was the vital 
importance of long-term debt for the financing needs of large firms. As late as 1980, 
French firms were the most highly indebted companies in the OECD, which put the 
banks in a position of serious influence over the affairs of industry; and because 
most of the debt was medium to long term, these banks generally took an active 
interest in the production and marketing strategies of the firms they supported in 
order to safeguard their investment (Cohen, Galbraith and Zysman 1985: 47; Hall 
1985). 
Most of these credit institutions were specialised banks who, combined, 
collected and disposed of two-thirds of all deposits in the French banking system. 
Beside these, there was a set of public investment funds, administering several 
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billions of francs, that were used for joint projects with private banks and as a 
discount fund for their loans (Hall 1986; Zysman 1983). 
The main problem in the system was that, by discounting the loans, the 
government in fact ended up assuming the risk and as a result, banks were, despite 
the close relationship between finance and industry, especially poor at long-term 
monitoring (Goyer 1998). In order to deal with this issue, the government's aim was 
to reorganise the financial system in two ways. The first was to dismantle the 
sectoral credit monopolies by allowing most banks to become universal banks, thus 
installing competition for loans and deposits between them. The second to liberalise 
the system of industrial credit through a series of fiscal regulations that made 
investing in stocks more appealing to households. As a result of these reforms, 
households had a variety of ways to save, and companies a variety of ways to obtain 
(a variety of) money: they could rely on long-term bank financing, issue shares to 
investors, and rely on retained earnings for investment. 
The financial reform of 1984 was followed by the privatisations (under the Right 
government after 1986) of many of the companies brought under the state's control 
only a few years before. The formal goals of this reform were simple: selling off the 
nationalised large firms using the new tools that had become available after the 
financial reform and thus create a popular capitalism of the Anglo-Saxon kind (Goyer 
1998; Schmidt 1996). 
However, the privatisations took place in a profoundly different way. Instead of 
being sold to a wide collection of potential owners, the companies were sold to five 
categories of investors only: the first was a hard core of stable share holders, the so-
called noyau dur, the second the workforce, the third, quantitatively most important 
part, to the public at large (i.e. using the financial instruments that were born out of 
the financial reform), and the fourth and fifth to French and foreign institutional 
investors (Cohen 1996: 237-8). The privatisations were designed so that employees 
were given a preferred shareholder status by reserving up to 10% of shares for 
employees and giving them discounts on the purchase (Schmidt 1996: 156-57). 
Furthermore, in many cases the government limited the maximum number of shares 
that individuals could buy, thereby assuring that ownership was not concentrated. 
And in order to avoid speculative bursts and unwanted swaps, shares that were not 
sold for a longer period (up to 18 months) were rewarded with an extra share or tax 
advantages. These hard cores consisted of groups of banks, insurance companies 
and industrial companies that acted as long-term institutional investors and were 
supposed to help govern the company and protect it from takeovers (Schmidt 1996: 
157-163). 
As a result of this gigantic financial engineering operation two stable groups of 
cross-shareholdings emerged, each one constructed around a giant utility company, 
a holding, a major bank, and a large insurance company. The first one had the 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, the holding Suez, the Banque Nationale de Paris and the Union 
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des Assurances de Paris at its core, the other the Générale des Eaux, PARIBAS, the 
Crédit Lyonnais, the Société Générale and the insurance company Assurance 
Générales de France (Morin 1995). Together, these financial cores had direct and 
indirect controlling stakes in each other and almost all publicly quoted large 
companies. For example, the UAP-BNP core held 8.8% in Air France, over 15% in 
Saint-Gobain, 9.2% in Elf, and 7.5% in Péchiney. The AGF-Paribas group held 20% 
in Aérospatiale, 20% in Usinor-Sacilor, 14% in Rhône-Poulenc, and 7.2% in the oil 
company Total. 
Because of the particular corporate governance structure in France, where small 
shareholders are neither directly nor indirectly represented (something the proxy 
voting system in Germany allows), this particular mode of privatisation should have 
amounted to an extraordinary control over industry by these hard core investors 
(Morin 1995). Yet the opposite was the case. Shareholders did get a better look at 
the inside of the companies - a result of the publication and accounting requirements 
following the opening up of the capital market - but that did not imply more control 
over management. Instead of reducing management autonomy, the reorganisation of 
the corporate governance system opened the way for the management of large firms 
to construct a broad sphere of independence from outside influences. 
The privatisation package included a set of rules on the selection of members of 
the board of directors, which gave the CEO the right to appoint most of the board 
members and of the hard core of investors more generally him- or herself. Since the 
companies that these people represented were frequently entangled in complex 
cross ownership arrangements with each other and with the company on whose 
board they sat, control was, if it took place at all, far from tough. Secondly, more 
management autonomy also implied more financial freedom. As a last and extremely 
effective safeguard against unwelcome surprises, many CEOs thus created or took 
control of subsidiaries that allowed them to buy back their floated shares. Even if the 
representatives of those companies on the board took their job seriously, they were, 
needless to say, more than careful in pressing too hard for control. Their career 
depended, after all, on the CEO that they formally controlled (see Schmidt 1996, 
pp.374-377 for full ownership details). François Morin, one of the most prominent 
observers of the restructuring of French capital, aptly calls this set-up „self-
management by management"(Morin 1995). 
Large firms used their own privatisation to construct a situation in which they 
were able to pursue internal reorganisations without being burdened by the 
traditional social policy, regional development and other non-financial 
considerations. Thus, this situation sheltered firms from hostile take-overs during the 
crisis years, while it assured the companies of the capital needed for the necessary 
restructuring. Secondly, this holding structure also created a situation of autonomy in 
relation to the state and the labour unions (who often depended on the state): it 
allowed firms to be reorganised through massive layoffs if this proved necessary, 
since the state was no longer the only (socially conscious) owner. In other words, the 
16 
large companies were able to pursue more relentless workforce reduction policies, 
and increase sub-contracting and outsourcing as a way to cut direct production 
costs. It also allowed, where necessary, international corporate alliances, as in the 
case of GEC-Alsthom or the planned merger between Renault and Volvo. In sum, 
the internal reforms - which frequently entailed a brutal externalisation of costs onto 
workers and small firms - could be pursued without state intrusion and against the 
will of the labour unions. 
The following two sections detail two critical areas of internal reform: the labour 
relations system writ large, and the supplier system. Both areas were at the heart of 
the initial restructuring to stop the crisis in the early years: massive lay-offs and rapid 
externalisation of immediate production costs. A thorough redefinition of the French 
production regime, however, required more than a simple reorganisation to cut 
costs. Without the organisational prerequisites for a move into more flexible mass 
markets (combining high volume with high quality and product differentiation), the 
crisis of the French model was bound to repeat itself, probably no later than during 
the next downturn in the business cycle. 
In itself, this was not a novel idea: in fact, many of the government policies right 
before and after the Mitterand election in 1981 started precisely from the premise 
that pure price-based competition was unlikely to yield a stable outcome (Albert 
1991; Hart 1992; Levy 1994; Ziegler 1997; Zysman 1977), a view shared by an 
important group of political economists (Boyer and Durand 1993; du Tertre 1989; 
Méhaut 1986; Salais and Storper 1993). The same idea was debated in the 
companies: the car producers Renault and Peugeot, the quasi-bankrupt steel 
industry, and public firms such as the railroad and electricity companies all realised 
that a corporate strategy simply based on high volume with low profit margins was 
increasingly untenable (Daley 1996a; Freyssenet 1998; Loubet 1998; Smith 1998). 
The search for new markets, however, so much was equally clear to all as well, 
implied a profound overhaul of the companies. 
Eventually new products were developed and new markets found. Renault 
managed to position itself in segments of the car market where it combined the cost 
advantages of mass production with innovative design, and thus create a series of 
relatively protected niches in different market segments (with the small mini-van-like 
Twingo, the medium-size van-like Mégane, the minivan Espace, and recently the 
utility vehicle Kangoo). Peugeot SA increasingly adopted a platform strategy to 
increase economies of scale while trying to keep the distinct identities of its two 
brands Citroën and Peugeot. The steel industry changed from a large collection of 
small autonomous mass producers into a highly integrated conglomerate of large 
volume and small speciality producers. EDF, which had fully exploited the mass 
production strategy with its large-scale nuclear energy program, succeeded in 
constructing new domestic, export and large-client market segments in order to 
avoid being stuck with an unaffordable electricity production surplus of over 10% 
(Wieviorka and Trinh 1989). And in response to the slowdown in passenger traffic, 
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the SNCF developed and commercialised the high-speed train TGV: from one third 
of turnover in the mid-1980s, passenger traffic today accounts for two-thirds of 
turnover (Cauchon 1997). 
Given the necessity to restructure workplaces and company organisation, how 
did the large firms succeed in doing this, despite the well-documented difficulties of 
French firms to move out of their predicament on their own account? Workplaces, for 
example, were highly tayloristic, which lowered mutual trust between workers and 
management, thus increasing the sources of industrial conflict, which fed into highly 
non-cooperative labour union politics. Suppliers were underfinanced and 
technologically unsophisticated and were therefore treated as cheap external 
workshops by the large firms; as a result profitability in the small firms remained low, 
which implied that they were unable to move out of their dependent situation. For the 
large firms, breaking through this kind of self-reinforcing disasters required 
independence from the state - which was provided by the corporate governance 
system - but at the same time also developing the capacity to deploy state resources 
in a way that supported large firm restructuring where necessary. 
3.4. Restructuring the labour relations system 
A redefinition of the French production regime critically hinged on shopfloor 
restructuring, and that, in turn, required a reorganisation of the broader labour 
relations system. Such a reorganisation implied solving two types of (different) 
problems. The first was related to the basic configuration of work organisation and 
skills. French firms were traditionally highly Taylorised, as a result organisational 
structures were inefficient (in large measure because they employed too many 
people), and they incorporated a wide array of obstacles to change. Repositioning in 
new market segments implied a profound overhaul of the work organisation system. 
The second, related, issue is union politics. French unions are radical, and mirroring 
the workplace relationships based on distrust, they are unwilling, and most likely 
unable, to take reform proposals, even by progressive management, seriously. 
However, because of their de facto capacity to block changes, a reorganisation of 
the workplaces depended either upon the labour unions' goodwill (which was not 
forthcoming), or upon a strategy that sidelined them. 
The reorganisation of the internal labour market followed very rapidly after the 
first measures that secured the survival of the companies. Since the early 1980s, the 
goal of official government policy has been to assure that by the mid-1990s, four out 
of five young people had a certificate of finished secondary studies - until the age of 
18 or 19, the so-called „Baccalauréat" or Bac. In effect, by 1995, around 75% of the 
age cohort passed the Bac exam, up from some 40% in 1984 (Courtois 1995). As a 
direct result, higher education also increased tremendously: almost half the students 
of the 1975 cohort (aged 18 in 1993) went on to some form of higher education: 22% 
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to university, 8.5% to the écoles supérieurs, and 16% to short-term higher education 
(the so-called Bac +2, a technical-commercial degree) (Courtois 1995). 
Alongside this quantitative increase in education, the contents of the vocational 
and technical training programs were reorganised as well, with France attempting to 
emulate the German dual training system (see Wood and Culpepper in this volume 
for details). As was to be expected, this attempt fell considerably short of its stated 
ambitions, since - as the French discovered along the way (Möbus and Verdier 
1997) - many of the institutional preconditions that made the German training system 
work, such as strong unions and employers associations, were simply not present in 
the French context. Moreover, the ideology of the schooling system, which regards 
itself primarily as a place where responsible citizens are produced, not workers, 
precluded most attempts to orient the educational system toward company needs. 
However, in its implementation, the reform of the vocational and technical 
curricula echoed the needs of large firms. The school inspectors in Paris who are 
responsible for the elaboration of training programs, obtain most of their information 
from the needs of the technologically most advanced sectors in industry, and these 
are the large firms. On occasions, large firms even managed to have a new technical 
diploma „created" just for them. Curriculum reforms frequently are organised in order 
to provide large firms with the skills that they (say they) need (Verdier 1997). 
While it was an important step, the revision of the vocational and technical 
training programs did not solve the workplace reorganisation problem. The 
educational system may have been producing skills that were considerably more 
attuned to the needs of the large firms, many of the older workers who were 
relatively ill-equipped for the new forms of work organisation, remained in the 
factories. In response, most large firms accelerated their existing workforce 
reduction programs - this time, importantly, not to cut costs, but to qualitatively adjust 
their workforce to the new product market strategies they were adopting. Thus, as 
elsewhere in Europe as well (Kohli et al. 1991), the French government funded these 
lay-offs by including many of the older workers in early retirement programs, the so-
called Fonds Nationale de l'Emploi (FNE) and the Fonds Industriels de 
Modernisation (FIM). They kept their income but disappeared from the factories 
without showing up in the unemployment statistics (Guillemard 1991). Most 
importantly, it allowed the large firms to replace relatively old, relatively underskilled 
workers with younger, better-trained workers (Beret 1992; Midler and Charue 1993). 
In the car industry, in the state-owned public service companies and in the steel 
industry, workforce restructuring followed precisely this path. In 1984, a report 
commissioned by the French parliament (the so-called "rapport Dalle) concluded 
that, in order to reach an acceptable level of international competitiveness, roughly 
40,000 jobs had to be cut in the car industry. By the late 1980s, the actual number of 
cuts had been almost 100,000, more than half of which were financed through the 
early retirement system and other similar government programs for "soft" lay-offs 
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such as reconversion funds and return premiums for immigrant workers. New 
workers, in turn, were hired with educational qualifications far above the previous 
ones and by the early 1990s the old unskilled workforce had almost entirely been 
replaced by younger workers with much higher educational credentials. Needless to 
say, since labour productivity in this latter group was higher as a result of their skills, 
considerably less were hired than laid off. In the steel industry, over 50,000 jobs 
were cut between 1980 and 1985 with the use of the early retirement system and, as 
in the car industry, younger technicians were hired instead (Daley 1996a; Smith 
1998). Finally, in the public sector companies EDF, SNCF and France Télécom, 
where lay-offs were impossible, workers were retrained while new hires were better-
trained than the previous generation (Cauchon 1997; Duclos and Mauchamp 1994; 
Wieviorka and Trinh 1989). 
Thus, the basic parameters in the human resources policies of the large firms 
were fundamentally changed. The evolution of the educational system raised and 
customised the skill basis of the young workers, creating a large skills reservoir. 
These skills were not - and cannot be, given the initial situation - of the „deep" 
technological kind that the German system produces (Soskice 1997), but involved 
general skills such as mathematics, languages and their application in industrial and 
commercial activities, software and computer knowledge, and a large set of "social" 
skills, enabling the exchange of information between workers, production units inside 
the company and the company and suppliers. In other words, they included a wide 
variety of skills peripheral to most production processes - administrative skills for 
low-level personnel and inventory management, as well as the skills required for 
quality control and interaction between different units inside the company - but that 
were essential to the large firms, since they allowed a restructuring of tasks and a 
reorganisation of work. The early retirement packages, then, made sure that these 
younger workers could replace the older ones. Relying on the institutional resources 
provided by the government measures, large firms thus were able to integrate a 
series of tasks that had been outside the purview of production workers into their 
jobs, which allowed them to pursue entirely novel, more sophisticated product 
market strategies, away from classical mass production (Salais 1988; Salais 1992). 
It is important not to misunderstand this outcome. French workplaces are still 
highly Taylorist (Linhart 1991). In fact, a survey of workplace practices (Duval 1996) 
emphasises that between 1984 and 1990, the central period in workplace 
restructuring, the number of workers in the French engineering sector who said they 
performed repetitive work, where the working rhythms were imposed by machines 
(typical characteristics of Taylorist mass production), increased by almost a third. 
Yet that was exactly the point of the new education programs and the way they 
articulated with the new workplaces: they left the core contents of the job largely 
untouched, but provided employers with skills for the administrative tasks 
surrounding the actual work. Since historically these had been exactly the types of 
jobs -control, administration, supervision and maintenance (Lane 1989; Maurice, 
Sellier and Silvestre 1988) - of which French companies had disproportionately 
many more than companies in other countries, reorganising those tasks offered 
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serious potential productivity increases, while the possibility to engage broader skills 
bases allowed for an increase in product and process complexity. 
Copying practices that already existed abroad, large firms thus reorganised the 
production process in such a way that small groups of workers re-appropriated many 
of the peripheral tasks: such teams of workers now perform primary maintenance 
tasks, low-level personnel administration (e.g. job rotation, holidays, etc.), quality 
control, inventory management and sometimes on-line contacts with suppliers. It 
may still be Taylorism, but it has a different form. 
Workplace reorganisation was intimately tied up with the labour relations 
system, because of the capacity by the labour unions to block far-reaching changes. 
Thus, restructuring workplaces also required installing forms of workplace 
communications that circumvented the unions. To create those, firms redeployed a 
series of institutional innovations in the labour relations system proposed by the Left 
governments of the early 1980s to their own advantage. 
In 1981 and 82, the government proposed a series of laws, the Auroux laws, 
which introduced new methods of direct workers' participation on the shopfloor that 
were not any longer monopolised by the labour unions. While usually the unions 
viewed government initiatives with a mixture of defiance and suspicion, for these 
reforms, both the Communist CGT and the Left-socialist CFDT, the two main unions 
at that moment, dropped their radical rhetoric and attempted to make the reforms 
work. The local union people, however, who were meant to implement the reforms, 
were incapable of playing this novel role. Since unions had been highly centralised 
prior to the reforms, the local union sections had in fact little or no experience with 
the type of "social-democratic" workplace union activities that the Auroux laws had 
carved out for them (Eyraud and Tchobanian 1985). Thus the fundamental 
discrepancy between local union capacities and the new requirements of the 
situation, made the unions (almost) collapse under the weight of the new situation. 
Employers' positions developed in a parallel way. The Auroux reforms initially 
appeared as the Fifth Column to them, and it came therefore as no surprise that the 
employers' association CNPF and most managers resisted their introduction (Weber 
1990). Gradually, however, employers began to see the advantages of the new 
institutions for shopfloor workers' participation that the laws created (Morville 1985). 
This was related to the structure of the Auroux reform project itself, which in fact 
consisted of two very different reform projects, one hidden underneath the other, 
almost like Russian dolls: the first project was a blend of "German-style" social-
democracy and self-management ideas carried over form the 1960s, while the 
second was "Japan-style" workers' integration (Howell 1992a; Howell 1992b). With 
the unions, the necessary ingredient for the first project to succeed, helplessly 
standing by the side, the second scenario, the flexible workplace, revealed itself. As 
soon as the boom of expression groups was tapering off, French industry thus 
witnessed an explosion of management-led quality programs and shopfloor teams: 
21 
from roughly 500 in 1981, the year of the Auroux reform, to over 10.000 in the 
summer of 1984 (Weber 1990: 446). In their search for an internal reorganisation, 
large firms thus simply picked from the labour relations policies those elements that 
allowed them to neutralise the labour unions. In other words, what was initially a 
worker-oriented reform package, became a management tool that helped defuse the 
conflict-ridden formal industrial relations institutions and allowed for a participative 
management model that integrated workers' skills into the production system without 
integrating unions in the corporate decision-making structure. 
Again, Renault provides one of the most graphic example of how the effects of 
these policies were used to create a new organisational model. Workforce 
reductions in the company during the 1980s were concentrated in the two plants in 
and near Paris - Billancourt and Flins - that had always had the most militant labour 
unions. In 1976 these two plants employed over half of the Renault assembly 
workers; in 1992, after the closure of the mother plant in Billancourt, only about a 
quarter of the total Renault assembly workforce in France was employed in the 
remaining Flins plant, with early retirement plans and normal retirement accounting 
for over half of these soft lay-offs. As a result, the militant unions were seriously 
weakened, and management had a relatively free hand in the reorganisation of 
workplaces. In 1989, the unions (without the CGT) signed a new type of more 
qualitatively oriented agreement, which individualised careers, decentralised training 
and installed shop-floor teams. This decentralised management model weakened 
the highly centralised unions even further, leaving management increasingly more 
freedom to pursue further reorganisations. Since new hires involved higher skills -
Renault currently employs more technicians and engineers than direct assembly line 
workers - the old class-based appeal of the radical "ouvriériste" unions was seriously 
diminished. In short, combining all the available resources, Renault managed to 
circumvent the unions in order to reorganise the shop floor (Hancké 1998). The end 
result was a doubling of labour productivity between 1984 and 1994, without an 
increase in capacity - a feat unknown in the world car industry (Williams et al. 1994)! 
In sum, in their search for competitiveness, the large firms had simply deployed 
the existing policies that dealt with the labour market and labour relations in such a 
way that the measures ended up serving their needs, almost regardless of their 
initial intentions. The changes in the educational system redefined the available 
skills; the early retirement packages and similar labour market programs allowed the 
firms to restructure their workforce by hiring younger workers; and the Auroux legacy 
neutralised the unions while providing institutional channels for the integration of 
workers into the company. In this process, the large firms changed the structure of 
their internal labour markets and of labour relations and then constructed a situation 
where workers and unions started acting on their terms, aligned with the strategic 
objectives of the large firms. 
A similar outcome can be found in the second crucial area of firm restructuring, 
supplier relations. Here as well, an initially deadlocked situation ended up being 
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changed as a result of how large firms reorganised their objectives and developed 
new strategies to pursue these. And, since such reorganisations were extremely 
difficult to pursue with their own internal resources, large firms again relied on 
government measures in related areas as a source of innovation. 
3.5. Reorganising supplier networks 
The changes in the supplier relationships of the large firms have to be understood in 
light of the dramatic financial problems they faced in the early 1980s. Gigantic 
losses, high debt and high interest rates put serious cost pressures on the large 
firms and, in order to clear the balance sheets, large firms attempted to externalise 
as many of the costs as possible. The most convenient way to resolve the financial 
problem was to drastically reduce in-house inventory, because it eliminated the 
capital costs required to carry the inventory while imposing a new mode of 
production which assured that these costs never reappeared. The answer was 
therefore the forced introduction of just-in-time delivery systems in French industry.3 
Very soon, however, large firms realised that their suppliers were unable to meet 
the kind of demands that these new, considerably more fragile systems imposed. JIT 
delivery requires suppliers to be able to deliver parts on time, i.e. either they carry 
the inventory, or they upgrade their internal operations and the links to the 
assembler in order to deliver parts on time. Additionally, it also meant that they had 
to be able to deliver zero defect quality, since the principle of JIT is precisely that 
parts be delivered when needed, which makes entry checks impossible. Thus, for 
the suppliers the rapid externalisation of production by the large firms through the 
introduction of JIT delivery systems, required more immediate attention to 
technology and quality, while the new links between the large firms and their sub-
contractors gradually shifted the burden to the tatter's long-term capabilities. Initially, 
such a shift was impossible to cope with for the suppliers. 
The causes of these adjustment problems are historical: the upshot of the 
Gaullist-inspired large firm-led development model in France (Kuisel 1981) was that 
small industrial firms were neglected in the modernisation plans, if not downright 
eliminated (Ganne 1992). Despite lip service to the small firms, industrial policies 
were, in fact, almost exclusively oriented toward the large firms.4 The small and 
medium-sized industrial firms that had been the backbone of France's economy 
before WW II - but were therefore also regarded as contributing to the economic 
3 The first mention of KanBan delivery systems in the car industry is 1982-83 (Labbé 1992); other 
industries followed suit rapidly and by the end of the 1980s, JIT was generalised in France 
(Gorgeu and Mathieu 1993). 
4 The French state was careful, of course, to further small artisanal firms because of their role as a 
political reservoir for the Right, and the numerical flexibility they provided for the mass-producing 
large firms (Berger and Piore 1980), but not with targeted industrial policies. 
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stagnation under the Third Republic (Ganne 1992) - were simply ignored in the 
economic development strategies of the state. 
As soon as this large-firm centered development model was implemented, 
however, the large firms at its core ran into severe problems that endangered their 
growth. Many large firm plants were located in areas where physical expansion was 
impossible, the local labour market was becoming unpleasantly tight for them and 
they therefore started searching, with the help of the first wave of decentralisation 
policies for production sites outside the industrial north-east (Caro 1993; Gorgeu 
and Mathieu 1995; Loubet 1995). While locating away from the industrial heartland 
had many advantages for the companies, such as space and a large additional 
workforce, it also had its drawbacks. The most important was that there were no or 
very few other industries there that could supply these large firms with parts; in 
response, the large firms negotiated with suppliers to locate in the area. 
As a result of this process of industrial relocation, a series of „proto-
regionalised" production networks in greenfield areas emerged, which were 
constructed like cartwheels with the large firm at its center, and where an abundant, 
docile and cheap workforce as well as dedicated suppliers existed. Many of these 
new regional production structures were furthered by the state policies of that period, 
which subsidised a decentralisation of production into underdeveloped areas. 
However, the suppliers were merely treated as extended workshops that diligently 
followed the instructions of the large firms. It was against this configuration that the 
reorganisation of supplier policies in the 1980s has to be understood. 
When the large firms were forced to reorganise their internal operations in the 
1980s, their intentions hit the limits of the French development model. For, in 
contrast to, for example, Baden-Württemberg and Emilia-Romagna, French industry 
was left without a vibrant small-firm sector. The relations between large and small 
firms in a sub-contracting relationship were exactly the opposite of what was needed 
for the reorganisation: the engineers of the large firms detailed the specifications, 
delivery times and work processes, and the SMEs diligently carried out the orders. In 
principle, at no point in the design and production process did the supplier make a 
contribution beyond simple execution (Rochard 1987; Veltz 1996: 24-29)). 
When, as a result of their own internal reorganisation, the large firms imposed 
new complex organisational arrangements nonetheless, the suppliers suddenly 
faced high costs for the externalisation of inventory associated with JIT parts 
delivery. Technologically, they were incapable of delivering high-quality goods, and 
they were not equipped to become sophisticated system suppliers. Ironically, the 
large-firm dominated development model had created serious obstacles to its own 
adjustment. 
Again, the large firms appealed to existing policies to fill the gaps in their own 
capabilities. The goal economic decentralisation policies passed by the first Left 
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government was to create a vibrant tissue of small and medium-sized firms in the 
regions. While this reform failed miserably in that goal (Levy 1994), it had the 
inadvertent effect of providing the large firms with a wide array of regional 
institutional resources that they could tap into in order to modernise their suppliers 
networks. 
These reforms were geared at regions which had, as a result of the regional 
development program of the 1960s, in fact become industrial monocultures: even 
today, in almost all of the 21 regions outside Ile-de-France, one large firm dominates 
the region in terms of output and (direct and indirect) employment (see the data per 
region in (Quélennec 1997)). As a result of their weight in those regions, the large 
companies were easily able to use the institutions created by the decentralisation 
programs of the 1980s to their own advantage: they were, in fact, the organisational 
interface between the regional institutions created or mobilised by the government, 
and the small firms that the policies were meant to address. 
In the late 1980s, for example, Peugeot PSA used the local engineering school 
in the Franche-Comté region, in the east of the country, to help its steel suppliers 
upgrade their technologies and products to meet the new corrosion standards that 
the car manufacturer was adopting in its next generation of cars (Levy 1994: 295-
317). PSA commissioned a study to evaluate the capabilities of its suppliers and 
then worked together with the local engineering university to develop a training and 
investment program for these companies. In a very short period, PSA's suppliers 
were able to supply the company with the high-quality steel it needed and, because 
they had been forced to meet the international ISO 9000 quality management 
standards, were able to keep on doing so on a permanent basis. It is noteworthy that 
almost none of the other local SMEs, who did not supply PSA with steel but for 
whom steel treatment was part of a broader in-house program, or who made high-
speciality steel, were involved in the program. And equally importantly, the total cost 
for PSA was very small: the car manufacturer contributed FF 200000 to the program; 
the local authorities over FF 1 Million. PSA was able to play this central role because 
it was by far the most important employer in the area, and because many small 
industrial firms were integrated into its production network. 
A similar rearrangement of regional resources took place in the Marseille area, 
where the steel company Sollac, again the largest local company, drew on the 
regional training funds to adapt the skills of its workforce to the technological turn 
that the company was taking (Hildebrandt 1996). In cooperation with the central 
Ministry of Education and a local training institution, the company first created two 
new industry-specific technical diplomas and then used its own training center to 
organise the courses - inanced by the public authorities. The same center was also 
used to retrain the suppliers' workforce, again mainly funded by the regional 
authorities. 
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Aérospatiale in Toulouse, Citroën in Bretagne, and chemical companies around 
Lyon have adopted a similar strategy of appropriating public resources for their own 
adjustment: local schools and training programs, regional technical universities, and 
the battery of local employment agencies, regional offices of the ministries of 
industry and regional development as well as the Foreign Trade Office were used to 
help the small firms upgrade organisationally and technologically and then to open 
up new markets for them. In all these cases, the end result was that the large 
companies were now able to redefine their product lines and that they could rely on 
sophisticated, technologically well-equipped suppliers. Almost all their suppliers 
today meet the ISO 9000 standards as a result of the reorganisation of the links 
between them and their large firm customers.5 
Importantly, however, all this attention to suppliers has not led to an increase of 
their power in the relationship with the large firms. Despite their technological 
capabilities, they rarely are closely involved in product development. Product design 
remains heavily centralised in the large firms' product development departments, 
who design new products as a collection of discrete, standardised, and in principle 
independent modules (Ulrich 1995). The gains of this product development method 
for the large firms are obvious: they offer the benefits of advanced design and 
flexibility without losing control over the process as a whole. Despite the increased 
sophistication of the suppliers, the situation remains structurally biased in favour of 
the customers (Hancké 1998). 
The new supplier policies of the large firms, and the increased reliance of the 
large firms upon their suppliers for system development and JIT logistics for 
production, thus eventually ended up reorganising French industry into a series of 
regional production networks, constructed around one large firm, dominating the 
region in every aspect: employment, output, regional investment.6 Increasingly, 
France began to resemble a collection of quasi-autarchic regional economies, in 
which the SMEs subordinated themselves to the exigencies of the large firms' local 
plants, by being integrated technologically and organisationally. The regional 
network that thus emerged was, in turn, subordinate to the strategies conceived and 
developed in headquarters, usually located in the Paris area. In embryonic form, this 
multiple-layered hierarchical structure had always existed, but after the crisis of the 
early 1980s, it became a building block for the large firms in their reorganisation. 
In addition to this far-reaching technical and organisational integration, large firms frequently also 
support SMEs in obtaining finance -indirectly through sub-contracting arrangements and ISO 9000 
certification, which signal the sérieux of the suppliers to outsiders, and directly through their 
broader networks involving banks or their own financial involvement (Cieply 1995). 
For a graphic representation, see the map of the geography of France in (Quélennec 1997) p.19. 
Relevant data are found in that volume, and in (SESSI 1997). 
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4. Conclusion: The new political economy of France 
French industry went through a dramatic adjustment phase after a crisis of 
tremendous proportions in the early 1980s. At the end of this process, French firms -
derided as "lame ducks" only ten years before - had become among the most 
profitable in the OECD, able to survive even the tough 1992 recession (ref.; Glyn 
1995). During the first years of the 1980s, large firms in France were forced to 
search for rapid measures to re-balance the books and then set out to reorganise 
their internal structures to secure competitiveness. This internal reorganisation was 
conditional upon increased management autonomy, especially from the state, which 
was provided by the privatisation of many large firms, and the way this interacted 
with the existing elite network. The internal reorganisation that followed, allowed 
French firms to pursue new human resources policies, introduce new methods of 
supplier integration and generally position themselves in new markets. 
The areas of internal reorganisation are particularly interesting, because they 
suggest a core element of the new French model of industrial organisation - and a 
major continuity with the pre-1980 set-up. Both in the workplaces and in supplier 
management, performance assessment and improvement instruments which were 
imposed by large firm management were crucial. France has among the highest and 
most rapidly rising ISO 9000 certification rates in the OECD, and among the highest 
adoption rates of quality-circle type workplace team arrangements (ref.). At the 
same time, workers' autonomy on the job, as well as small firm autonomy in product 
development, remains low. ISO 9000 and quality circles both are efficient 
instruments for reorganising workplace and inter-firm relations but without 
endangering managerial hierarchies; increased job autonomy and product 
development competence, on the other hand, will lead to a situation where 
managerial authority might be undermined. As in the earlier period, therefore, the 
"presidentialism" of French management, in large measure a result of the social 
distance between management elites and the rest of the company (or, more broadly, 
the supplier network), remains a core element of the French model. 
Different from the past, however, is the wider context of management. Under the 
old regime, large firms were policy instruments for the state; precisely that 
configuration is fundamentally different today. Instead of a state-led path, the French 
adjustment trajectory was a firm-led one. Despite some dirigiste attempts in the 
1980s, the French state today plays a considerably smaller role in the economy than 
before, and has lost much of its capacities to direct industrial and economic 
adjustment. However, and equally important, the gap that emerged was not filled by 
the market, but by a mode of coordination which included elites in the state 
apparatus, large firms and haute finance, who assured that large firms were able to 
construct a novel institutional environment for their own adjustment and then induce 
other relevant actors - the state, labour unions, the workforce, other companies, and 
the financial world - to act according to their preferences. 
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This novel perspective on France - firm-led instead of market-led adjustment -
not only helps make sense of the developments since the early 1980s, it also sheds 
new light on an old theme in the study of France - the société bloquée. According to 
this perspective, reforms are difficult to implement in France, because they are 
conceived with strong societal actors in mind (in recent years because they were 
technocratically copied from the successful German experience), but the actors are 
too weak in fact to be able to become the social bearers of the policies. The result is 
policy failure - and a more general fundamental unreformability of the country's 
political economy. The financial deregulation, for example, led to elite-controlled 
cross-shareholdings instead of popular capitalism (Bauer 1988; Maclean 1995), 
because the banks were incapable of playing the new monitoring role designed for 
them (Goyer 1998). The Auroux workplace reform resulted in weaker instead of - as 
intended - stronger labour unions, because the unions were incapable of turning the 
institutional innovation into advantages for themselves (Howell 1992b). And the 
decentralisation of policy-making led to an increased dependence on Paris instead 
of the construction of new policy-making systems in the regions to support industrial 
development, because the regional associations were unable to provide the type of 
interface between the firms targeted and the regional institutes that were supposed 
to serve them (Levy 1994). Reforms turned into failures because the social actors 
that were critical to their implementation, were too weak. 
Changing the perspective to the large firms as the central agents in the French 
political economy puts these apparent failures into a fundamentally different light. 
The large firms used the institutional resources provided by these policies and then 
deployed them on their own terms in their own strategic adjustment. The financial 
deregulation allowed large firm CEOs to construct a broad sphere of autonomy; the 
Auroux laws provided large firms with institutions to defuse the perennial workplace 
conflict; and the decentralisation policies offered the large firms instruments to 
upgrade their regional supplier base. In short, by shifting the perspective to strategic 
adjustment by the large firms, policy initiatives that are documented as dramatic 
failures, take the shape of institutional resources for the large firms - a very different 
idea indeed than what is offered by the société bloquée. 
Finally, there are the questions that remain. The first, and at the heart of the 
research program on varieties of capitalism, is where to locate France in the 
comparative political economy debate in general, and in the "organised v. liberal 
market economy" categories in particular. While France most certainly has not 
become a liberal market economy - market mechanisms have not been at the basis 
of the adjustment - it has also become obvious from the discussion in this chapter 
that the earlier state-centered mode of coordination has lost a lot of its power. With 
this relative retreat by the state, France lost an important basis for its 
exceptionalism; yet at the same time, the mode of coordination, with roots in the 
state, survived by adapting to the new conditions, which in turn provided the basis 
for economic adjustment. As in other countries, the mode of coordination of capital in 
France suggests ways of exploring the French adjustment path in the 1980s and 
1990s. 
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However, it is important to underscore the differences between France and other 
advanced market economies. France is not a German-style coordinated market 
economy, governed by associations which provide public goods and thus have the 
capacity to enforce compliance. Instead it relies on tight links between economic and 
administrative elites, and upon a series of mechanisms that assure information flows, 
and provide monitoring and sanctioning capacities within this elite network. 
Recruitment into this system passed via the state instead of private circles, and was 
critically dependent upon the state as the orchestrator of the system. 
The gradual disengagement by the state and the concurrent changes in the 
mode of elite coordination therefore raise the question about how to understand the 
changes in the French model. One way of looking at it is to see it as a hybrid, which 
relies on the market as a means of coordination in some areas, and upon non-
market mechanisms for others. Yet if it is indeed best seen as a hybrid, this has 
serious theoretical implications, for the constituent elements then are less coherent 
than the idea of institutional complementarities underlying the varieties of capitalism 
approach suggests. However, if the internal viability of the model is threatened 
precisely of its lack of internal congruence, does this mean that we are perhaps 
witnessing a transition in France from a primarily non-market mode of coordination to 
a market-based model? In short, studying the evolution of the French political 
economy in the future will remain a major contribution to the systemic approach 
adopted in this volume. 
The final issue is the social and economic sustainability of the new French 
model. Assuming that the changes documented are here to stay, the question is how 
the core of this new model will survive changes in France's immediate competitors. 
The strong performance of French industry is almost entirely a result of competition 
on low unit labour costs. Yet such a competitive model is dependent upon the 
policies pursued in the main trading partner countries. As long as demand is high in 
the trading partners and relative unit labour costs less favourable - as is currently 
the case in Germany, France's main trading partner - French industry can easily find 
markets. Yet when German industry becomes more cost-competitive, probably as a 
result of the introduction of productivity-enhancing new organisational models, the 
competitive gap closes, and it is unclear how French industry will deal with that new 
challenge. 
At least as important, French industry may be in a more favourable position now, 
but this has come at a large social cost.7 A glance at the unemployment statistics 
and the current debate on social exclusion reveals that the adjustment process has 
created a new set of social problems. Unemployment is, of course, primarily a 
macro-economic problem, a result of the restrictive monetary policies imposed by the 
German central bank and the Maastricht Treaty on the rest of Europe (Carlin and 
Soskice 1997). Yet, given the level of unemployment in France, some elements are 
7 This is the subject of a large and growing literature on and in France at the moment. See (Lipietz 
1998; Todd 1998) for repesentative references. 
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particular to the French situation. Since the adjustment path in France was primarily 
one of reducing costs, which entailed serious reductions in the workforce of the large 
firms, a relatively strong link may exist between the micro-economic adjustment 
model and its macro-economic effects. A large part of the 4 to 5 percentage point 
differential between the German unemployment rate, controlling for the increase due 
to the incorporation of the former GDR, and the French, can be attributed to the 
strategy based on wage costs and workforce reductions followed by French industry 
(Boltho1996). 
A similar point can be made regarding social exclusion. Since entry into the 
internal labour markets of firms depends crucially on educational credentials - even 
for workers - those without official diplomas easily find themselves in a situation 
where they acquire no job experience, thus making themselves even less desired by 
potential employers. Around the large cities, the areas with low-income housing, 
where educational levels are also among the lowest in the country, have therefore 
slowly turned into US and UK ghetto equivalents - one of the most explosive social 
problems that the country currently faces. 
Slowly, the effects of this adjustment model are making themselves felt in the 
political system as well. Despite the favourable competitive position of most 
exporting firms and France's stable trade surplus, the main culprit for the social 
problems is, in the French debate, the rise in international trade (Berger 1995). As a 
result of this preoccupation with the position of France in the international economy, 
a new cleavage seems to be emerging in French politics, orthogonal to the 
conventional Left-Right lines. The first grouping shares two basic ideas: less market 
(and therefore more state) and national preferences; the second is more liberal and 
pro-European. This new constellation leads to strange bed-fellows indeed. In the 
first camp, we find the Communist Party, nationalist factions in the Socialist Party 
(the MDC), and on the Right (Séguin), as well as the fascist Front National. In the 
second, we find most of the Parti Socialiste, and the liberal parts of the Right. How 
stable is this new fault line in French politics? Will it eventually lead to a realignment 
of the party system which supersedes the old Left-Right divisions? 
As these questions suggest, the new France is far from stable. The relatively 
successful adjustment of the economy has created a series of shocks from which 
France has difficulty to recover and in the process, many of the basic parameters of 
the French political economy have been redefined. The state's role in the economy 
is smaller, European markets and politics more important, the social safety net 
smaller and social insecurity higher, and as a result of that, the political system is 
increasingly coming under pressure. Despite the prima facie continuities with the old 
regime, one is tempted to ask if this is in fact a silent transition to the Sixth Republic? 
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